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Abstract 
This article assesses how the ‘security-development nexus’ has impacted multilateral 
aid to conflict-affected states; an area until now understudied. Using a mixed methods 
approach, we examine both the policy discourse and aid commitments of the major 
multilateral donors: the European Commission, the World Bank, and the UNDP. We 
investigate the extent to which these donors fund the sectors identified within the policy 
discourse as crucial to ensuring peace and stability – democratisation and peace, conflict, and 
security activities - and examine the impact of ‘Western’ security concerns on multilateral aid 
in conflict-affected states. Our new data indicate that in contrast to policy discourse, post-
conflict states receive no more multilateral funding for democracy building than states which 
have not suffered from conflict and furthermore, that in the context of the security-
development nexus, multilateral aid to conflict-affected states is influenced by the key 
transnational security concerns of Western states. These results point to a potentially 
dangerous gap between policy and actual aid commitments, ignore the long-term nature of 
development and weaken the impartiality of multilateral aid. 
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Introduction 
The idea that conflict and instability in the Global South cannot be separated from 
development considerations and may have wider security implications, particularly for the 
Global North, has become pervasive within development discourse. Whilst the impact of this 
so-called ‘security-development nexus’ on bilateral aid has been investigated1, the extent and 
manner to which it has impacted multilateral aid remains understudied. In response, this 
research firstly assesses the extent to which both multilateral policy and practice in conflict-
affected states reflect the security-development nexus.  
We find that the policy discourse of multilateral donors strongly upholds the idea that 
inclusive democratic political structures in conflict-affected states are essential to establishing 
long-term peace and security. However, we also find that in practice, conflict-affected states 
receive no more multilateral funding for democracy-building programmes than states that 
have not suffered conflict.  
Secondly, for key funders of these multilateral institutions, including the US and the 
UK,2 conflict and fragility in the Global South are perceived to threaten national security 
through increasing migration and the opportunity for terrorist groups to operate. In 
recognition of this, this article investigates the influence of these security concerns on 
multilateral aid to conflict-affected states. Our results suggest that these concerns indeed 
influence this type of aid.  
We conclude then that there is a gap between the stated priorities of multilateral 
donors and their actual aid commitments. This finding may reflect the short-termist nature of 
aid programming, with long-term investment in democratisation activities relegated in favour 
of conflict-resolution activities, which have been shown to exacerbate instability and 
conflict3. Furthermore, we find that within the context of the security-development nexus, 
multilateral aid to conflict-affected states reflects the transnational security concerns of major 
Western states. 
 
The security-development nexus and multilateral donors 
Security concerns largely dictated donors’ development policies during the Cold War. 
After a brief period in which such concerns were delinked from development, with donors 
reluctant to engage in conflict zones,4 the mid-1990s saw a resurgence of the link between 
security and development. However, whilst during the Cold War, development aid was 
provided with the strategic aim of bolstering capitalism or communism, in its current form 
the security-development nexus holds that conflict, fragility, and instability in the global 
South may constitute a threat to Western security.5 The extent to which the policy and, 
crucially, practice of multilateral donors have been influenced by this security-development 
nexus and, within this context, by the security concerns of their main funders is the central 
question of this article. In addressing it, we examine the policy discourse and aid-provision of 
the three major multilateral channels of delivering development aid: the World Bank’s 
International Development Association6 (IDA), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and - for European Union (EU) donors - the European Commission (EC).  
Multilateral donors have been described as less susceptible to political, commercial, 
and strategic considerations than bilateral donors and relatively more responsive to 
recipients’ need.7 There is also, however, evidence indicating that multilateral aid is not 
insulated from the interests of key member states. Research suggests that the Bretton Woods 
institutions8 align their policies with the interests of their key Western funders9 and attempt to 
impose a Western development model on aid-recipient states.10 The World Bank derives 96 
per cent11 of its funding annually from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and EU member countries and has been criticised as beholden in its 
policies to the United States and their Western allies.12  
Whilst the UNDP is also predominantly funded by Western states13, it has generally 
been understood as less influenced by Western interests than the Bretton Woods 
institutions,14 although Berthelemy15 found that the UNDP provided more aid to major global 
arms importers. The European Union as a regional institution of politically and socially 
integrated states can be expected to represent the interests of its members.16 Indeed, there is 
evidence that the European Commission accounts for member states’ interests when making 
aid-allocation decisions,17 even though Furness and Gänzle18 argue that the coherence of the 
security-development nexus within such aid allocation is constrained by collective-action 
challenges as well as bureaucratic and institutional complexities.  
Moving beyond the existing literature, we investigate (1) the extent to which the 
security-development nexus, prevalent in current bilateral policy discourse, is reflected in 
multilateral policy discourse, (2) how this discourse may have affected multilateral aid flows 
in practice, and (3) the extent to which, in the context of the security-development nexus, the 
key transnational security concerns of Western states are reflected in multilateral aid 
provision to conflict-affected states. In distinction from previous studies, we do not aggregate 
the multilateral aid but examine each donor separately.  
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. First, we examine the 
development policy discourse of the European Commission, World Bank, and UNDP in order 
to establish the extent to which it reflects the security-development nexus and to identify the 
type of programmes that are understood to contribute to peace and security in conflict-
affected states. Drawing on this analysis, we then construct four testable hypotheses 
regarding multilateral aid commitments in conflict-affected states and introduce the article’s 
theoretical framework, the data used, and the methods employed to analyse them. The final 
sections present the results obtained and discuss their policy and political implications, and 
consider a number of explanations for our findings. 
 The security-development nexus within policy discourse 
To what extent does the policy discourse of the three multilateral donors reflect the 
trend towards securitisation19 established within the bilateral policy discourse? And what 
does this discourse suggest about the type of programmes to be funded in conflict-affected 
and fragile states? In order to answer these questions, we undertook a systematic data 
collection and analysis of development policy documents from our three donors spanning the 
last two decades. Major policy documents such as World Development Reports and reports 
setting out overarching development strategies were examined, along with policy documents 
specifically dealing with conflict, security, and development. Using qualitative analysis 
software an iterative processes of analysis was used with text coded to categories and patterns 
identified20. Given the questions above, primary-cycle coding involved coding references to 
security, conflict/instability and fragile states, as well as to refugee movements and terrorism 
etc., to identify how these concepts were understood in the discourse. Secondary-cycle 
coding sought to identify patterns and links between these concepts - for example, how 
‘fragile states’ are understood in relation to ‘global security’. Secondary-cycle coding also 
sought to establish the types of programmes deemed appropriate in conflict affected and post-
conflict states. This eventually led to hierarchical coding of programmes where various codes 
were placed under umbrella categories to make sense of them. The results of this qualitative 
analysis are as follows.  
Within the development policy discourse, the approach to conflict-affected states 
consists of two interrelated assumptions. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in 
the Global South are mutually reinforcing and that there can be no security without 
development and vice-versa.21 All three multilateral donors agree on this point. 
In addition, the European Commission holds that through terrorism, refugee flows, 
and international crime, instability and conflict in the Global South are sources of 
international insecurity.22 For example, according to the European commission ‘fragile states, 
weak governance, socio-economic, and socio-political grievances provide uninhibited 
operating space for violent extremists’.23 In contrast, whilst the UNDP is concerned about 
global challenges such as transnational organised crime and violent extremism, it is careful 
not to differentiate between conflict-affected/fragile states who have the potential to increase 
insecurity at an international level and stable democratic states who may be under threat from 
the former, arguing that the ‘duality between developed and developing states has lost 
relevance’.24 As such, according to the UNDP, new transnational challenges including 
terrorism, climate change and migration cannot be tackled within the confines of ‘aid’ as it is 
traditionally conceptualised.25 With near universal membership and representation, it makes 
sense for the UNDP not to problematise the Global South in relation to the Global North, but 
to recognise challenges that negatively impact all states. The EU on the other hand represents 
its European members, many of whom have increasing securitised what are perceived as 
negative flows from the Global South, including terrorism and refugees.26 
For the World Bank, conflict-affected and fragile states are central to its work and the 
institution recognises ‘new threats’ emanating from these states such as terrorism and 
trafficking.27 However, the World Bank also understands that conflict and violence should 
‘no longer [be] seen as restricted to fragile states; in fact, fragility and violence affect nearly 
all states’.28 
The second assumption guiding all three institutions is that development aid can be 
used to enhance security and prevent conflict in the Global South.29 The European 
Commission argues that development aid plays a crucial role in stabilising conflict situations, 
whilst the UNDP maintains that international finance including development aid can help 
build the inclusive social contract underpinning peaceful societies.30 
The policy discourse of the three donors does therefore to some extent mirror the 
security-development nexus established in the policy discourse of bilateral donors.31 In order 
to assess the extent to which this discourse has affected multilateral aid practice, we need to 
ascertain the types of programmes justified by the security-development nexus within the 
multilateral donors’ policy discourse. According to the policy discourse of all three donors, 
reducing and preventing future conflict and ensuring long-term peace requires two types of 
development interventions. The first seeks to encourage the development of democratic, 
inclusive societies, which respect human rights and promote gender equality. According to 
the UNDP, a ‘...solid, inclusive social contract, underpinned by democratic governance can 
help maintain an equilibrium between competing interests and reduce fragility and the 
likelihood of organised violence’.32 Even more specifically, the EC argues that ‘strengthening 
the fundamental building blocks of equitable development, human rights, governance and the 
rule law’ are key in tackling violent extremism.33 Similarly, the World Bank recognises that, 
whilst it may be difficult, ‘the high road to peace and prosperity is best approached through a 
consensual form of politics featuring inclusive political coalitions … and … accountable 
institutions’.34  
The second type of development programmes understood by multilateral donors as 
able to contribute to peace and security in conflict-affected states are explicit conflict-
prevention and resolution measures. These include the disarmament of civilians, reform of 
the security, police, and justice sectors, and civilian ‘peace-building’ activities.35 Conflict-
prevention work has become a fundamental aspect of global development policy, pursued by 
all major development institutions including the three assessed in this study.36 
In summary, the UNDP, the EC, and the World Bank agree that peace and 
development in the Global South are indivisible and that development aid can and should be 
used to contribute to peace and security in conflict-affected countries. All three multilateral 
donors advocate the view that development aid can mitigate conflict through (1) 
democratisation programmes (alternatively referred to, particularly by the World Bank, as 
good-governance programmes) and (2) explicit conflict-prevention measures. Whilst the EC 
directly emphasises the security of its members in this endeavour, the World Bank and the 
UNDP avoid an explicit position depicting security in the Global North as threatened by 
conflict and violence in the Global South. 
 
Quantitative theoretical framework and hypotheses 
In order to assess the extent to which this policy discourse is reflected in practice, we 
investigate whether conflict-affected states receive more aid for the priorities identified by the 
multilateral donors as crucial to restoring peace and stability, than states that have not been 
affected by conflict. Specifically, we test whether the donors have, in the past two decades, 
committed relatively more aid to democratisation activities and to explicit conflict, peace and 
security activities in conflict-affected states than elsewhere.  
As a second step in the analysis, we investigate whether conflict-affected states that 
are perceived to pose a higher threat in terms of the ‘new’ or unconventional transnational 
security concerns of terrorism and refugee movements receive more aid for democratisation 
or conflict prevention than conflict-affected states perceived to pose a lower threat. Both 
terrorism and refugee flows are, along with conflict and instability in the South, heavily 
‘securitised’ within the development policy discourse of key Western bilateral donors 
including the US, the UK and Denmark37 as well as by the European Commission.38 By 
securitised we mean that both are understood to pose a potential national security threat and 
have been widely accepted as such, including in the UK’s latest strategic defence and security 
review.39 
The hypotheses, formulated on the basis of the donors’ policy discourse, are as 
follows: 
 H1: The EC, IDA, and UNDP channel relatively more aid to democratisation activities in 
conflict-affected states than elsewhere. 
H2: The EC, IDA, and UNDP channel relatively more aid to conflict, peace, and security 
activities in conflict-affected states than elsewhere. 
H3: The EC, IDA, and UNDP channel relatively more aid to democratisation activities in 
conflict-affected states that are perceived to pose a higher security threat by key Western 
donors. 
H4: The EC, IDA, and UNDP channel relatively more aid to conflict, peace and security 
activities in conflict-affected states that are perceived to pose a higher security threat by key 
donors.  
 
We strongly expect H2 to be confirmed by the data analysis, but include it as a first 
step towards testing H4, which will show the extent to which the security concerns of key 
Western donors affect the provision of conflict, peace, and security aid in conflict-affected 
states. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Dependent variables 
In testing the first hypothesis, our dependent variable is the proportion of 
development aid provided by each of the three multilateral donors to democratisation and 
institution-building activities40 (further referred to in this article as ‘democratisation aid’). 
Specifically, these activities include support for democratic participation and civil society, 
legal and judicial development, legislatures and political parties, elections, anti-corruption, 
human rights, women’s rights, and free media. When testing the second hypothesis, the 
dependent variable is the proportion of aid channelled to recipients’ conflict, peace, and 
security activities41 (further referred to in this article as ‘conflict, peace, and security aid’). 
This category comprises aid provision to security-system management and reform; civilian 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; participation in international peacekeeping 
operations; reintegration and small-arms and light-weapons control; removal of landmines; 
and work with child soldiers. 
We examine the donors’ aid commitments rather than aid disbursements, for two 
reasons. First, OECD data on aid disbursements to different sectors are unreliable and 
available only after 2002.42 Second, aid commitments are subject to fewer arbitrary executive 
decisions and are less influenced by recipients’ administrative capacity than aid 
disbursements. Consequently, they reflect donors’ intentions more closely than 
disbursements.43 
 
Main independent variables 
The main focus of this article is the impact of states’ conflict-status, along with the 
extent to which they are understood to a pose security threat to the multilateral donors’ main 
funders, on the proportion of aid committed by multilateral donors to democratisation and to 
conflict, peace, and security activities. States’ conflict-status is approximated via three 
variables. The first is conflict intensity from the Uppsala University Conflict Data 
Programme (UCDP), which rates countries from zero (no conflict) to two (high conflict 
intensity). The second variable, post-conflict, is a binary variable of our own design, where 
countries are designated as post-conflict for five years following a descent from two to one 
and three years following a descent from one to zero on the UCDP conflict-intensity scale44. 
The last variable used to measure conflict affectedness, again constructed for the purpose of 
this research, measures the longer-term post-conflict period; i.e. five years after the end of the 
post-conflict period as long as no new conflict has erupted, and is referred to as ‘LT post-
conflict’. This variable takes into account potential donors’ concerns regarding the absorption 
capacity of recipients in or immediately after armed conflicts, particularly with regard to 
democratisation aid. We use the variable primarily as a robustness check. 
The extent to which an aid recipient poses a potential security threat, in terms of new 
transnational security concerns, to the multilateral agencies main funders is operationalised 
using data on the number of refugees received by OECD/EU countries from each aid 
recipient in one year and the number of OECD/EU casualties from terrorist attacks in the aid-
recipient country that year. This compound variable is utilised when testing hypotheses for 
the IDA and UNDP, with the rationale that OECD/EU states account for more than 95 per 
cent of the two institutions’ regular funding. To reflect its membership, the European 
Commission’s security threat variable for each aid recipient is computed from the number of 
refugees received from an aid-recipient state by EU member states only and the number of 
EU casualties from terrorist attacks in that state. Data on refugees were obtained from the 
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees database and data on terrorist attacks from 
the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland. The two data components were 
first standardised to zero-one values, then summed, and finally re-coded into a zero-three 
scale, where zero signifies none or low and three high security concerns for each aid agency. 
The constituents of the security concern variable - refugee flows and terrorist attacks - 
were chosen based on what donors identify as the key unconventional transnational security 
threats within the context of the security-development nexus, i.e. security threats that can be 
mitigated through development aid. As discussed, both migration and terrorism (along with 
conflict and instability in the Global South, which is already captured in the analysis) are 
identified as key global challenges by the multilateral donors’ key funders including the UK 
and the US.45 However, because existing aid literature has conventionally utilised arms 
transfers as the approximation of countries’ security concerns,46 as a robustness test we use 
an alternative security-concern variable that adds to the refugee and terrorist casualties data 
arms exports data as well (from EU countries for the EC and from OECD/EU countries for 
the IDA and UNDP). The alternative security-concern variable is similarly to the main 
security-concern variable coded on a scale from zero (no concern) to three (high concern). 
 
Control variables 
Following existing literature on aid allocation,47 our model further controls for 
recipient needs and donor interests other than security. Keeping in mind our overall focus on 
the proportion of aid committed to government and civil society (both conflict, peace, and 
security aid and democratisation aid fall under this remit) rather than total aid flows more 
commonly analysed by researchers, an obvious recipient need should be poor governance - 
since we can expect countries with poor governance to potentially benefit the most from 
donor investments in their government and civil society sectors. We operationalise 
governance through the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). We also 
control for countries’ GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and their 
population size, both obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Turning to donor interests other than security, trade flows with recipients may 
influence donors’ decisions vis-à-vis the proportion of aid committed to activities under the 
government and civil society sector – such investment could be seen as an incentive or 
reward to trading partners. Whilst such an effect can be expected to be weaker in the case of 
multilateral donors than bilateral ones,48 it is possible that the main funders of the multilateral 
agencies shape the agencies’ aid allocations in line with their own commercial interests. 
Therefore, as further control variables we include measures of export and import flows 
between recipient countries and EU member states for the EC and between recipient 
countries and OECD/EU countries for the IDA and UNDP, all obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics. We also control for former 
colonial status and the region where each aid-recipient resides. Descriptive statistics of the 
control variables used are displayed in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
 
Dataset and methods 
The dataset used in this study covers 132 aid-recipient countries for 21 years (1995-
2015). We chose 1995 as the lower cut-off year as this was when the policy discourse 
connecting development with security began to emerge,49 whilst 2015 is the most recent year 
for which aid data were available at the time of our research. In order to account for 
bureaucratic inertia in aid provision as well as for the fact that aid is often committed to 
projects and programmes several years in advance, the data are not analysed annually but 
averaged over seven three-year periods. As a robustness test, however, we also examine the 
relationship between a state’s conflict-status and aid to conflict, peace, and security and to 
democratisation activities using two-year and four-year averaged data. Unlike annual data, 
the averaged data according to the Arellano-Bond tests are not serially correlated. 
The selection of the appropriate empirical estimator is hence driven primarily by the 
censored nature of the data: they are downward-censored by zero, i.e. cannot take negative 
values, and as any measure of proportion upward-censored by one. As our main estimator, we 
hence use panel Tobit regressions with random dyad effects.50 All the regression models 




Table 1 displays trends in the main dependent and independent variables for the first 
and last time periods examined. All three donors increased their average aid commitment per 
recipient from 1995-1997 to 2013-2015. The rate of increase has substantially differed, 
however, with the UNDP raising its aid provision by approximately a quarter, IDA by a half, 
and the EC by more than two times. All three donors also augmented their relative aid 
provision to democratisation and to conflict, peace, and security activities. Of the three 
donors, only the EC commits relatively more aid to conflict, peace, and security activities 
than to democratisation, whilst the UNDP invests relatively more in democratisation 
activities, with almost 45 per cent of its aid commitments going to that sector in the last wave 




Turning our attention to the key independent variables, the average conflict intensity 
declined over the two decades examined, from 0.28 to 0.18, whilst the proportion of post-
conflict countries increased, from 12 to 16 per cent. Figure 1 demonstrates that the proportion 
of aid committed to post-conflict countries increased correspondingly, with the IDA 
providing the largest relative amount by 2015. The proportion of long-term post-conflict 
countries, in contrast, decreased, from nine per cent in 1995-1997 to seven per cent in 2013-
2015.  
Regarding the security concern variables, in the first time period examined the 
average EU security concern variable was higher than the average OECD/EU security 
concern variable. By 2013-2015, however, the average aid recipient was of a higher security 
concern for all OECD/EU countries than for only EU member states. The alternative security-
concern variables, composed of data on refugees, casualties of terrorist attacks, as well as 




Summary statistics of the control variables, shown in Table 3 in the Appendix, 
demonstrate that aid recipients’ GDP per capita along with EU and OECD/EU exports to and 
imports from aid-recipient countries on average increased in the two decades under 




The provision of democratisation aid (hypothesis 1) 
The left part of Table 2 assesses the first hypothesis - that the three multilateral 
donors, in line with their policy discourse, channel relatively more aid to democratisation 
activities in conflict-affected countries. Our results do not support the hypothesis. There is no 
significant relationship between aid recipients’ conflict intensity or post-conflict status and 
the proportion of aid committed to democratisation activities by either the EC or the IDA, in 
spite of the policy discourse. A positive relationship does not appear even in the longer-term 
post-conflict period. The UNDP actually commits relatively less aid to democratisation 
activities in countries that have been affected by conflict than elsewhere. The security-
concern variables, both the main and alternative one, do not appear to significantly impact 
aid-allocation to democratisation activities by any of the three multilateral donors analysed. 
Of the control variables employed, GDP per capita has a consistent negative effect on 
the proportion of aid provision to democratisation, aligning with our expectation vis-à-vis 
recipients’ needs. The IDA and UNDP also commit more democratisation aid to recipients 
with whom the OECD/EU members have a stronger trading relationship whereas the EC does 
so for former European colonies. Countries with better governance receive significantly less 
democratisation aid from the EC than countries with poorer governance scores. Of the three 
donors, only the UNDP increased its relative provision of democratisation aid over time, 
although as the results above show, not to conflict-affected countries. 
 
The provision of conflict, peace, and security aid (hypothesis 2) 
The right part of Table 2 tests our second hypothesis, according to which the three 
multilateral donors, in line with their policy discourse, commit a higher proportion of aid to 
conflict, peace, and security activities in states affected by conflict. The results, as expected, 
strongly support this hypothesis. All the donors examined channel relatively more conflict, 
peace, and security aid to post-conflict countries and the EC and IDA also commit relatively 
more of such aid to countries presently involved in conflict. Unlike the other two donors, the 
EC continues to provide relatively more conflict, peace, and security aid to countries in the 
longer-term post-conflict period (five to ten years after the cessation of hostilities). 
Our other key independent variable, security concern, exhibits a positive significant 
relationship with the three donors’ conflict, peace, and security aid-proportion as well, 
whether measured through its main or its alternative form. This finding demonstrates that 
independent of aid recipients’ conflict status, the EC, IDA, and UNDP channel relatively 
more conflict, peace, and security aid to countries in the Global South that constitute a higher 
transnational security risk for their main funders. Countries including Albania, Egypt, 
Lebanon or Kenya that are not affected by conflict but are of high security concern to 
OECD/EU donors receive significantly more multilateral conflict, peace, and security aid 
than countries such as Nicaragua, Niger, Madagascar, and Zambia that are similarly not at 




Regarding other factors affecting the dependent variable, quality of governance as 
measured by the WGI has a negative influence on the relative aid allocation to conflict, 
peace, and security activities by all three multilateral agencies but only in the case of the EC 
the relationship is significant. The EC, IDA, and UNDP also commit less conflict, peace, and 
security aid to economically more affluent countries. Finally, for the EC and UNDP there is a 
clear positive time trend throughout the two decades towards committing a higher proportion 
of aid to conflict, peace, and security activities, as was previously indicated by the summary 
statistics in Table 1. 
The results in Table 2 do not point to the existence of any stark differences between 
the three different donors’ aid commitments. Unlike the other two multilateral agencies, the 
UNDP provides less aid to democratisation activities in countries at conflict; however, 
neither the EC nor the IDA actually commit significantly more of such aid to conflict-
affected countries as their discourse would suggest. This is not the case even in the longer-
term post-conflict period, which we included in the model specifically to investigate whether 
concerns about absorptive capacity may have prevented the donors from increasing the 
relative provision of democratisation aid to countries in or straight after conflict. 
Nevertheless, the results do indicate that after hostilities cease in a given country, multilateral 
donors over time invest slightly more in democratisation activities there, with such trend most 
notable for the EC and least for the UNDP. In practice the UNDP appears to overlook the 
proclaimed importance of democratisation aid in conflict-affected states to a greater degree 
than the EC or IDA. 
On the other hand, in line with the policy discourse, all three multilateral donors 
examined channel more conflict, peace, and security aid to conflict-affected countries. The 
EC and IDA do so both in conflict-involved and post-conflict countries whilst the UNDP 
commits relatively more conflict, peace, and security aid only to countries in the post-conflict 
period. Combined with its relatively weak commitment to democratisation aid in conflict-
affected states, of the three donors the UNDP could be described as the least affected by the 
securitisation of aid. As discussed above, this may be indicative of the UNDPs universalist 
structure; Western concerns regarding conflict and instability in the South have less of an 
impact on its aid distribution. 
In order to assess the robustness of the findings discussed above, we estimated the 
same models with data averaged across two-year and four-year periods as well (see Table 4 
in the Appendix). The results for the key variables - aid recipients’ conflict status and level of 
security concern to Western donors - are in both direction and significance very similar to the 
ones attained with the three-year-averaged data in Table 2, supporting the overall validity of 
our findings. 
 
The impact of the transnational security concerns of Western states (hypotheses 3 and 
4) 
The results from testing hypotheses 1 and 2 provide evidence that multilateral 
development aid to conflict-affected countries is focused on conflict, peace, and security 
activities but not on democratisation activities. Within the pool of conflict-affected states, 
however, some may be of significantly higher security interest than others for key Western 
funders of multilateral agencies. Accordingly, hypotheses 3 and 4 test whether conflict-
affected countries of higher security concern to Western states receive proportionally more 
aid commitments to democratisation activities (hypothesis 3) and to conflict, peace, and 
security activities (hypothesis 4) than conflict-affected and post-conflict countries of lower 
security concern to key Western donors. 
The left side of Table 5 in the Appendix shows that conflict-affected states of a high 
security concern for the multilateral agencies’ key funders receive no more or less EC or 
UNDP democratisation aid than conflict-affected states of a comparatively lower security 
concern. Countries of higher OECD/EU security concern do receive considerably more 
conflict, peace, and security aid from the IDA, but neither the interactions of conflict-
affectedness and security concerns nor their marginal effects appear statistically significant 




However, Figure 2, based on the right part of Table 5 in the Appendix, shows that the 
proportion of aid committed to conflict, peace, and security activities in post-conflict states 
does vary with different degrees of security concern (testing hypothesis 4). The findings 
suggest that all three multilateral donors commit more conflict, peace, and security aid to 
conflict-affected recipients that are of higher security concern to Western states, i.e. the 
institutions’ main funders, than to conflict-affected states that are of lower security concern. 
The conditioning effect of security concern is particularly strong for the EC and the UNDP. 
The EC commits significantly more conflict, peace, and security aid to conflict-affected 
countries of high security concern to the EU, whilst the UNDP does so for conflict-affected 
countries of moderate and high security concern to OECD/EU countries. The IDA does not 
seem to be influenced by aid recipients’ security importance to the same degree as the other 
two donors, but post-conflict countries that are of the lowest security concern to OECD/EU 
members (score of zero) do not receive significantly more conflict, peace, and security aid 
from the IDA than states not affected by conflict, unlike post-conflict countries of higher 
security concern. 
 
Multilateral aid and the security-development nexus 
Since the mid-1990s, development and security have been considered as mutually 
constitutive by major OECD donors, with development aid understood as having a central 
role to play in the creation of peaceful, stable societies. We have found this to be true for 
multilateral donors as well. The European Commission, World Bank, and United Nations 
Development Programme emphasise two approaches through which aid can help strengthen 
security in the Global South: (1) investing in creating democratic, rights-respecting, inclusive 
societies, which are understood to have the characteristics necessary to deal with conflict in 
nonviolent ways and (2) investing in ‘conflict, peace, and security’ programmes, which 
include civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, reintegration of soldiers, 
and security-sector reform. Having established this context, this article went on to examine 
the extent to which the policy discourse is reflected in actual aid commitments. Furthermore, 
because for many Western states the security-development nexus is underpinned by the 
assumption that conflict and instability in the Global South are a threat to their national 
security, this research also assessed whether the security concerns of the key funders of 
multilateral aid agencies have impacted multilateral funding in conflict-affected states.   
Whilst all three multilateral donors strongly uphold the position that building states 
with robust institutions which respect human rights is fundamental to creating a lasting 
‘liberal peace’ in areas affected by conflict, our results demonstrate that this is not mirrored in 
actual aid provision. Neither the EC nor the IDA have provided proportionally more 
democratisation aid to conflict-affected or post-conflict countries than elsewhere and the 
UNDP has committed less democratisation aid to countries involved in active conflict.  
As a second step in our analysis, we tested whether conflict-affected countries receive 
proportionally more aid to conflict, peace, and security activities, which were also 
highlighted as necessary in reducing conflict and strengthening security in the policy 
discourse (hypothesis 2). The results have provided robust support to this expectation; all 
three donors channel more conflict, peace, and security aid to post-conflict countries and the 
EC and IDA also to countries at conflict. Whilst this result was expected, it may be 
understood within the context of a wider trend towards the securitisation of aid flows. 
Official development assistance is defined by its ‘promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries’51 and it was not until the mid-2000s that the definition 
of ODA was widened to include expenditures under the fields of conflict, peace, and security. 
Such expenditures would previously have been taken from different government budgets 
rather than aid.52 The expansion of what can be defined as development aid may be 
suggestive of this trend. 
Although the multilateral donors examined, particularly the IDA and the UNDP, have 
in theory an obligation to be impartial53, they have often been observed to align their aid 
disbursements with their main funders’ interests.54 Hypotheses 3 and 4 thus conjectured that 
the trend towards the securitisation of development by key bilateral donors may impact 
multilateral aid commitments in conflict-affected states of higher security interests to the 
donors’ key funders - the EU member states in the case of the EC and OECD and EU 
member countries in the case of the IDA and UNDP. In line with the donors’ policy 
discourse, we operationalised the security-concern variable on the basis of compound refugee 
flows and terrorist casualties. We tested the robustness of such-attained results with the 
inclusion of an alternative security-concern variable that comprises arms-transfers data in 
addition to the data on terrorist incidents and refugee flows. 
The behaviour of all three multilateral donors confirmed the hypothesis in the case of 
conflict, peace, and security aid. In other words, the EC, IDA and UNDP commit relatively 
more aid to conflict, peace, and security activities in those conflict-affected countries that are 
of a higher security concern to their main funders (e.g. Sudan, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) than in conflict-affected countries of lower security concern (e.g. Chad, 
Mozambique, Tajikistan). In contrast, whether recipients are of a high or low security 
concern does not play a significant role when it comes to donor decisions about 
democratisation-aid commitments in conflict-affected countries. 
These results indicate that there is a gap between the policy discourse and aid 
commitments: whilst the policy discourse highlights democratisation activities as essential to 
creating and sustaining peace and stability in the global South, conflict-affected states, even 
those in a longer-term post-conflict phase, receive no more funding for democratisation 
activities than states not affected by conflict. At the same time, however, the results suggest 
that multilateral aid commitments to conflict-resolution and prevention activities not only 
reflect donors’ discourse but are also influenced by the security concerns of Western states.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated that, in line with the rhetoric of key bilateral donors, the 
policy discourse of multilateral donors to some extent reflects the security-development 
nexus. Security and development in the Global South are understood as indivisible and, for 
the EC, linked to the security of its member states. However, there is a significant disconnect 
between the multilateral policy discourse and actual aid commitments. Furthermore, the 
influence of Western states on multilateral aid provision to conflict-affected states is 
apparent. The implications of these results are explored below. 
First, they show that with regard to the provision of multilateral aid to conflict-
affected countries, as in many other areas,55 there is a considerable gap between donors’ 
expressed priorities and actual aid flows. Over the last two decades, academics and the NGO 
community have been increasingly concerned about the effects of the security-development 
nexus on development outcomes. Our finding that aid provided by three major multilateral 
donors is channelled to conflict, peace, and security activities, but fails to underpin the 
establishment of democratic, inclusive societies in conflict-affected states is unlikely to 
alleviate these concerns. 
These findings may reflect the short-termist nature of aid programming, as identified 
by Denney,56 with donors more willing to invest in conflict-resolution activities deemed to 
yield quick results than in initiatives requiring longer-term investment.57 In the case of the 
European Union, our results chime with Furness and Gänzle’s observation that the EU’s 
External Action Service ‘has continued to focus on immediate threats rather than on long-
term development challenges’58 as well as with Del Biondo and Orbie’s59 finding that despite 
the rhetorical importance placed on democracy promotion through aid, the European 
Commission often foregoes this goal to pursue more immediate aims. Similar conclusions 
have been reached vis-à-vis the World Bank’s and UNDP’s aid-provision trends.60 Such 
donor behaviour runs contrary to research suggesting that only long-term solutions can bring 
about sustainable peace61 and that prioritising narrow security objectives actually leads to the 
marginalisation of female and minority rights.62 As Brown et al.63 illustrate, when Western 
security forces used aid to promote short-term national security interests in Afghanistan, 
long-term development did not follow; rather, the way in which aid was distributed created 
local frustration with wasted resources and increased corruption. 
In addition it is recognised amongst practitioners and academics that development 
agencies are under pressure to demonstrate positive development aid results64, i.e. to show 
that ‘aid works’. It may be difficult to yield demonstrably positive development outcomes 
through investing in democratisation programmes in conflict-affected states. In Sierra Leone, 
for example, a programme to reform the chieftaincy system was abandoned because it was 
too complex and challenging to yield results in the short term.65 In addition, aid agencies are 
under pressure to demonstrate value for money and efficiency in the design of projects and 
programmes.66 This pressure may result in aid for democratisation being channelled to areas 
where value for money can be demonstrated more easily, rather than to complex 
environments affected by conflict and instability in which value for money may be hard to 
establish.  
These finding are in line with Crawford, who found donors’ democracy promotion in 
Ghana to be ‘high on rhetoric but...low on delivery’.67 In view of Ghana’s favourable political 
environment in which to strengthen democracy, Crawford68 suggests that donors’ 
commitment to democracy promotion is unlikely to be stronger in less favourable 
environments, which would include conflict-affected and post-conflict states. Crawford 
identifies three possible reasons for his finding: donors’ reluctance to shift away from 
traditional aid programmes oriented towards socio-economic development; a focus on 
security and stability; and that donors’ interest in democracy is limited to minimising 
government rather than deepening and widening participation in political processes. The 
latter, it is argued, results in a focus on technical good governments (or public sector reform) 
and decentralisation. This may explain why the EC, IDA, and UNDP have failed to provide 
more democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries, despite discourse to the contrary: the 
donor-preferred technical ‘democratisation’ activities are not suitable and often not possible 
to implement in fragile, conflict-affected environments, where state capacity needs to be 
strengthened and unity rather than decentralisation promoted.  
Our findings further demonstrate that despite World Bank and UNDP statements to 
the contrary, they, along with the EC, reflect the transnational security concerns of their main 
funders in their aid commitments to conflict-affected states. This finding adds weight to 
arguments that these institutions mirror Western interests in their policies and practice and 
demonstrates how Western donors use a variety of channels to influence outcomes in 
conflict-affected states deemed to be of security concern. 
However, the extent to which this practice might influence development and policy 
outcomes in conflict-affected states depending on their apparent security interest to the West 
needs further investigation. Whether or not conflict-affected countries of lower security 
concern are disadvantaged because they receive relatively less conflict, peace, and security 
aid than countries of higher security concern is thus far, unclear. The short-termist nature of 
such aid and its potential to exacerbate conflict, as noted above, may indicate that they are 
not, but this requires further research.  
In conclusion, the impact of the security-development nexus on multilateral aid 
commitments to conflict-affected states is nuanced, with a differentiated impact on discourse 
and on investment in different types of projects in different states depending on the extent to 
which they are a security concern to the donors’ main funders. In light of our results 
demonstrating increasing conflict, peace, and security aid in strategically more important 
states without the corresponding investment in long-term democratisation, we suggest further 
research into the rationale, interests, and bureaucracies underpinning these trends and into the 
effects of such trends on development outcomes within the Global South. 
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